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This paper provides empirical evidence of how a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities shape the diversiﬁcation–value relationship on a sample of U.S. companies 
between 1998 and 2010. Our ﬁndings suggest that the negative relationship between diversiﬁcation and a ﬁrm’s value may reverse at high levels of 
diversiﬁcation, and that such a U-form diversiﬁcation–value relation is partly mediated by a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities. Results are robust to various model 
speciﬁcations and after controlling for endogenous self-selection of the diversiﬁcation decision.
1.
Introduction
value. In this regard, Campa and Kedia (2002), Miller (2004), a
Villalonga (2004b), among others, argue that certain factors affe
ing a ﬁrm’s decision to diversify may also drive value outcomCorporate diversiﬁcation and its effect on a ﬁrm’s value is
a long-standing controversy in the literature. The bulk of the 
research is not optimistic about the implications of this strat-egy 
for value creation while, at the same time, diversiﬁed ﬁrms 
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Overlooking such endogeneity may misattribute valuation effects 
to this strategy rather than to a ﬁrm’s circumstances prior to the 
diversiﬁcation decision. Once this endogeneity is controlled, 
Campa and Kedia (2002) report a premium. Nevertheless, Hoechle 
et al.(2012) cast doubt on this argument since they still obtain a 
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t maintain their relevance in modern economies. Evidence in pri
literature ranges from the diversiﬁcation discount (the maj
posi-tion, as documented by Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger an
Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Stowe and Xing, 2006; Hoechle et a
2012) to the diversiﬁcation premium (Campa and Kedia, 200
Villalonga, 2004a), and also includes the lack of any signiﬁca
relationship (Villalonga, 2004b; Elsas et al., 2010). The so-calle
diversiﬁca-tion puzzle remains unresolved, in both the academ
and business sphere.1
The origin of this conﬂicting evidence also remains unclea
One prominent strand of research suggests that endogeneity ma
obscure the true relationshipbetweendiversiﬁcationandcorpora
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: p.andres@uam.es (P. Andrés), gfuente@eco.uva.es (G. Fuente
mpilar@eco.uva.es (P. Velasco).1 “But is there an optimum degree of diversiﬁcation? It is a question many of our 
clients ask us (advisers at the Boston Consulting Group)” (Heuskel et al., 2006).
g discount even when endogeneity is accounted for.
Much of the empirical literature addresses the ‘average effec
of diversiﬁcation in terms of discount/premium, yet insufﬁcie
attention is paid to the cross-sectional variation of diversiﬁca-ti
value outcomes (Stein, 2003). In this sense, recent resear
embraces a contingent approach and posits that the impact 
diver-siﬁcation on a ﬁrm’s value may differ across ﬁrms. Th
relationship may be inﬂuenced by certain factors such as t
institutional frame-work (Lins and Servaes, 1999), the indust
(Santaló and Becerra, 2008), or diversity of growth opportuniti
(Rajan et al., 2000), to name but a few.
Among those factors, the literature has compiled suggestive ye
inconclusive evidence concerning ﬁrms’ growth opportunitie
Cer-tain papers such as Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) expla
the diversiﬁcation discount on the grounds that single-segmen
ﬁrms have more growth opportunities whereas multisegmen
ﬁrms may have exhausted part of these. Further supportin
evidence, such
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for variations in the presumed mediator (GOR); (ii) variations in the s Ferris et al. (2002), reveals for a sample of international joint
entures, that diversiﬁcation is value-destroying in ﬁrms with a
eak cash ﬂow position and low growth opportunities available
n contrast, other evidence (Stowe and Xing, 2006) shows that the
iscount remains after controlling for growth opportunities.
Based on this strand of literature, we empirically analyze
hether the effect of diversiﬁcation on a ﬁrm’s value (dis-
ount/premium) may be contingent on growth opportunities.
irstly, we explore how diversiﬁcation shapes the value of a
rm’s growth opportunities (more speciﬁcally, the proportion
f growth opportunities value over a ﬁrm’s total value, here-
nafter, the growth opportunities ratio, or GOR). According to
yers (1977), growth opportunities are one component of a ﬁrm’s
arket value (the other being the value of assets in place). Were
iversiﬁcation to have a signiﬁcant effect on GOR, we would test
hether a proportion of the total effect of diversiﬁ-cation strategy
n a ﬁrm’s value is channeled via the value of growth
pportunities. To address this potential mediating role of growth
pportunities, we follow Baron and Kenny’s (1986: 1176) causal
tep method. This approach is based on analyzing whether the
irect effect between diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm value (widely
ocumented in prior literature) becomes weaker once the medi-
tor GOR is accounted for in the model. If so, it will conﬁrm
hat part of the impact of diversiﬁcation is channeled through
OR.
Our empirical analysis is carried out on a dataset of U.S. ﬁrms
rom 1998 to 2010 (16,859 ﬁrm-year observations). Our empirical
vidence is based on U.S. on a post-1997 sample, after com-
ng into force the new SFAS no. 131 accounting standard. We
ccount for the endogenous self-selection of the diversiﬁcation
ecision using the Heckman two-step estimation. Given that this
trategy is not random but is rather selected by companies, the
eckman procedure enables a ﬁrm’s ex-ante underlying char-
cteristics to be disentangled from ex-post diversiﬁcation value
utcomes.
Our study contributes to the existing literature by offering a
eeper empirical insight into the trinomium corporate diversi-
cation, growth opportunities, and ﬁrm value, on which prior
esearch has reached inconclusive results. Our ﬁndings show that
he diversiﬁcation–value relationship may take a U-form, this
urvilinear effect being partly mediated by growth opportunities.
esults are robust to alternative proxies and methodologies. Over-
ll, our study provides an additional explanation to performance
ivergences across diversiﬁers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The fol-
owing section describes the sample, variables, and models to be
stimated. Section 3 presents our main empirical ﬁndings. The
nal section discusses results and conclusions.
. Sample, variables, and estimation strategy
.1. Data and sample selection
The initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel sample of
.S. public companies over the period 1998–2010. Data is extracted
rom Worldscope (annual data, both at the industry segment and
ompany level2), Datastream (market data) and the U.S. Bureau of
conomic Analysis3 (macroeconomic data). To build a dataset con-
istent with prior literature, we select the sample following the 
erger and Ofek (1995) criteria.4 These criteria reduce the sample
2 Industry segment data at the 4-digit SIC code level.
3 This body belongs to the U.S. Department of Commerce:
ttp://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm .
4 See Berger and Ofek (1995) for more details about sample selection.size to 28,206 ﬁrm-year observations for the period 1998–2010
(67% corresponding to pure-play ﬁrms and 33% to diversiﬁers).5
Next, we exclude ﬁrm-year observations with negative common
equity and outlier observations of the study variables.6 Our ﬁnal
study sample comprises a maximum of 16,859 ﬁrm-year observa-
tions corresponding to 3190 ﬁrms.
2.2. Empirical models and variables
As a starting point, we analyze the relationship between diver-
siﬁcation and growth opportunities by estimating Eq. (1):
GORit = ˛ + ˇ1DIVERit + ˇ2DIVER2it + ˇ3LTAit + ˇ4DTAit + ˇ5it
+ˇ6Industry dummiesit + ˇ7Year dummiesit + vit (1)
where i identiﬁes each ﬁrm, t indicates the year of observation 
(from 1 to 13), ˛ and ˇp are the coefﬁcients to be estimated, and it 
is the random disturbance. The dependent variable (growth oppor-
tunities ratio (GOR)) is proxied by either the market to book assets
ratio (Adam and Goyal, 2008), Tobin’s Q (Cao et al., 2008), or the
ratio of R&D expenses to total sales (Mehran, 1995). The degree of
diversiﬁcation (DIVER) is computed by alternative measures to test 
the robustness of our empirical ﬁndings: the number of businesses 
at the 4-digit SIC code level (numsegments), the Herﬁndahl index
(HERF) (Hirschman, 1964), and the entropy measure (TotalEntropy)
(Jacquemin and Berry, 1979). HERF is calculated as:
HERF = 1 −
n∑
s=1
P2s
where ‘n’ is the number of a ﬁrm’s segments (at the 4-digit SIC code
level), and ‘Ps’ the proportion of the ﬁrm’s sales from segment ‘s’.
This index positively relates to the level of diversiﬁcation, its values
ranging between 0 (focused ﬁrms) and 1.
TotalEntropy is computed as follows:
TotalEntropy =
n∑
s=1
Ps ∗ ln
(
1
Ps
)
where ‘Ps’ is the proportion of a ﬁrm’s sales in segment ‘s’ for a
company with ‘n’ different 4-digit SIC segments. The higher the
total entropy, the greater the diversiﬁcation, although this index
has no upper boundary.
Following prior literature, we control for ﬁrm size (Andrés et al.,
2005), leverage (Myers, 1977), industry effect, and time effect. Size
(LTA) is estimated by the natural logarithm of the book value of
total assets. Leverage (DTA) is calculated by the total ratio debt
over total assets. We include dummy variables to control for the
major groups of industries7 and dummies to control for the year
effect.Once we have conﬁrmed the relation between GOR and diver-
siﬁcation, we apply Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach to test the
mediation role of growth opportunities in the relation between 
diversiﬁcation (independent variable) and excess value (depend-
ent variable). According to Baron and Kenny (1986), GOR will act as
a mediator if it meets three conditions: (i) variations in the inde-
pendent variable (the ‘diversiﬁcation level’) signiﬁcantly account mediator (GOR) signiﬁcantly account for variations in the depend-
ent variable (excess value); and ﬁnally (iii) when the mediator
5 These proportions are similar to those reported by prior works such as Villalonga 
(2004b).
6 We drop observations beyond three standard deviations from the sample mean
for each variable.
7 The U.S. Department of Labor major industries classiﬁcation: http://
www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic manual.html.
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columns (2)–(4) extend probit speciﬁcation (1) by incorporating 
lags and dummy years. The goodness-of-ﬁt (pseudo-R squared) lies GOR) is considered, a previously signiﬁcant relation between the
ndependent and dependent variables no longer signiﬁcant proves
full mediation) or becomes weaker (partial mediation).
Condition (i) is tested by estimating the results of previous
qua-tion (1), while conditions (ii) and (iii) are checked by means
f estimating Eqs. (2)–(4). Eqs. (2) and (3) relate excess value and
iversiﬁcation. Eq. (2) allows us to replicate prior research, while
q. (3) adds a squared term for the variable of diversiﬁcation:
xcessValueit = ˛ + ˇ1DIVERit + ˇ2EBITsalesit + ˇ3CAPEXsalesit
+ˇ4LDTAit + ˇ5LTAit + ˇ6LTA2it + ˇ7it
+ˇ8Industry dummiesit
+ˇ9Year dummiesit + it (2)
xcessValueit = ˛ + ˇ1DIVERit + ˇ2DIVER2it + ˇ3EBITsalesit
+ˇ4CAPEXsalesit + ˇ5LDTAit + ˇ6LTAit
+ˇ7LTA2it + ˇ8it + ˇ9Industry dummiesit
+ˇ10Year dummiesit + vit (3)
xcessValueit = ˛ + ˇ1GORit + ˇ2DIVERit + ˇ3DIVER2it
+ˇ4EBITsalesit + ˇ5CAPEXsalesit + ˇ6LDTAit
+ˇ7LTAit + ˇ8LTA2it + ˇ9it
+ˇ10Industry dummiesit
+ˇ11Year dummiesit + vit (4)
here i identiﬁes each ﬁrm, t indicates the year of observation
from 1 to 13), ˛ and ˇp are the coefﬁcients to be estimated, and it
s the random disturbance. The dependent variable is excess value
ExcessValue), as developed by Berger and Ofek (1995), and is
eﬁned as the natural log of a ﬁrm’s market value to its imputed
alue.8 This measure assesses the diversiﬁcation dis-count/
remium by comparing the diversiﬁed ﬁrm’s value against the
alue of an equivalent portfolio of unisegment ﬁrms. More-over, in
ine with prior literature (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Campa and Kedia
002; Santaló and Becerra, 2008), we control for proﬁtability, level
f current investment, ﬁnancial leverage, ﬁrm size (and its square)
ndustry (Industry dummies), and year effect (Year dummies)
roﬁtability is estimated by the EBIT to sales ratio (EBITsales), and
he level of investment by capital expenditures to total sales ratio
CAPEXsales). Financial leverage is measured by the ratio of long-
erm debt to total assets (LDTA), and ﬁrm size is approximated by
he natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (LTA).
A summary of the descriptive statistics of our study’s variables
s shown in Table 1. Overall, the number of a ﬁrm’s segments
anges between 1 and 6 in the sample. We also observe an average
iscount (−0.0760).
.3. Econometric approachOne methodological concern widely documented in diversi-
cation research and which must be addressed is endogenous
8 See Berger and Ofek for a detailed explanation of the calculation of the excess 
alue. We calculate the ﬁrm’s imputed value based on sales multipliers due to the 
reater availability of data of sales at the segment-level in Worldscope. Consistent 
ith most prior literature, we estimate a ﬁrm’s market value (MV) as the sum of 
arket value of equity (MVE), long-term (LtD), short-tem (StD) debt, and preferred 
tock (PrefStock) (Campa and Kedia, 2002).self-selection9 (Campa and Kedia, 2002; Miller, 2004; Villalonga,
2004b), since diversiﬁcation is not a random status, given that
ﬁrms self-select to diversify. Heckman (1979) considers this
sample selection as an omitted variable problem and proposes a
two-stage estimation procedure to correct for it.
More speciﬁcally, we run Heckman two-step estimations of our 
models. In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate a probit equation to model 
the ﬁrm’s propensity to diversify (selection equation) and to esti-
mate self-selection correction, lambda () (the inverse of Mill’s
ratio). Following Campa and Kedia (2002) and to ensure the
compa-rability of our results with prior research, we consider the
following selection equation:
Dit = 0 + 1LTAit + 2EBITsalesit + 3CAPEXsalesit
+4PNDIVit + 5PSDIVit + 6ChangeGDPit
+7CONTRACTIONit + it (5)
Dit =1 if D∗it > 0 and Dit =0 if D
∗
it
< 0, where D∗
it
is an unobserved
latent variable observed as Dit =1 if D∗it > 0 (diversiﬁed ﬁrm), and
equalling zerootherwise (unisegmentﬁrm), andit is anerror term.
Independent variables assume that the diversiﬁcation decision is
driven by characteristics10:
• at ﬁrm-level: ﬁrm size (LTA); proﬁtability, approximated by the
ratio EBIT to sales (EBITsales); and the ﬁrm’s level of investment
in current operations, proxied by the ratio capital expenditures
to total sales (CAPEXsales)
• at industry-level: industry attractiveness, based on both the frac-
tionofﬁrms in theﬁrm’s core industry that arediversiﬁed (PNDIV)
and the proportion of the ﬁrm’s core industry sales accounted for
by diversiﬁers (PSDIV)11
• and at the macro-economic level: economic cycle attractiveness,
approximated by the real growth rates of gross domestic prod-
uct, calculated as the GDP percent change based on chained 2005
dollars (changeGDP); and the number of months in the year the
U.S. economy was in recession (CONTRACTION).
The selection correction (i) computed in the ﬁrst stage of the 
Heckman procedure is introduced as an additional regressor in the 
second stage (as shown in the speciﬁcation of our models
indicated above), where outcome equations (1)–(4) are estimated.
The signif-icance of i identiﬁes the presence of selectivity in the
sample. In the absence of any selectivity, the correlation ()
between the resid-uals of the selection equation and the outcome
equation is close to zero, and the lambda coefﬁcient lacks
statistical signiﬁcance.
3. Empirical ﬁndings
3.1. Heckman ﬁrst stage: ﬁrm propensity to diversify
Table 2 reports the estimations of the selection equation, the
ﬁrst stage of the Heckman procedure (Eq. (5)). Estimations inin the 0.1562–0.1610 range, comparable to prior literature. Among 
characteristics at the ﬁrm-level, LTA and its lag display a positive
9 Sample selection arises when a random sample is not observed but when the 
sample observation selection is not independent of the outcome variables (Winship 
and Mare, 1992). Selectivity has been the subject of intensive research (especially in 
the labor economics ﬁeld) since, if not appropriately controlled, it causes bias in 
results.
10 See Campa and Kedia (2002) for a further explanation of variables selection. 
11 We calculate these two proxies at the 4-digit SIC level.
Table 1
Summary statistics of variables for the full sample (1998–2010).
Variable N Mean Median Standard deviation Min. Max. 1st quartile 3rd quartile
Excess value 16,859 −0.0760 −0.0079 0.7939 −2.8458 2.6628 −0.5525 0.4192
wExcessValue 16,859 −0.0732 −0.0079 0.6943 −1.3840 1.1216 −0.5525 0.4192
MBAR 16,859 1.7132 1.4071 0.9614 0.0835 5.5235 1.0318 2.1058
Q 16,859 1.2086 0.9453 0.9380 0.0000 4.9612 0.5525 1.6094
RDsales 10,942 0.0631 0.0192 0.0937 0 0.6931 0 0.0924
numsegments 16,859 1.3506 1 0.6514 1 6 1 2
HERF 16,859 0.0983 0 0.1852 0 0.7925 0 0.0700
TotalEntropy 10,441 0.2234 0.0000 0.3309 0 1.6559 0.0000 0.4998
Control variables
LTA 16,859 5.8327 5.7692 1.7386 1.5217 9.9975 4.5002 7.0799
EBITsales 16,859 0.0554 0.0669 0.1790 −1.1784 1.1792 0.0134 0.1291
CAPEXsales 16,859 0.0676 0.0328 0.1098 0 0.9348 0.0164 0.0670
DTA 16,859 0.2014 0.1788 0.1766 0 0.7391 0.0263 0.3290
LDTA 16,859 0.1620 0.1233 0.1642 0 0.7391 0.0022 0.2745
PNDIV 16,859 0.4386 0.4286 0.2195 0 1 0.2857 0.5772
PSDIV 16,859 0.5553 0.5922 0.2979 0 1 0.3322 0.7968
changeGDP 16,859 0.0222 0.0270 0.0195 -0.026 0.048 0.0180 0.0360
CONTRACTION 16,859 1.6763 0 3.1024 0 9 0 0
This table displays descriptive statistics of the variables involved in our models for the ﬁnal sample of 16,859 ﬁrm-year observations of unisegment (12,257 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations) and multisegment companies (4602 ﬁrm-year observations). Some observations contain missing data for certain variables. Excess Value is the measure developed by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) to assess the value created by diversifying. wExcessValue is the winsorized excess value measure. MBAR (the market to book assets ratio), Q (Tobin’s 
Q) and RDsales (the ratio of R&D expenses to ﬁrm sales) are the three different proxies for growth opportunities. Numsegments (number of business segments), HERF (the 
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serﬁnd-ahl index), and TotalEntropy (the Entropy index) are three alternative mea
APEXsales (level of investment in current operations), DTA and LDTA (ﬁnancia
macroeconomic conditions). Figures are expressed in million US$.
nd highly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (above the 1% level), suggesting
hat larger enterprises are more likely to engage in diversiﬁca-
ion. EBITsales is only statistically signiﬁcant in the models where
agged variables are omitted. Our results reveal that less proﬁtable
ompanies are more liable to diversify. The CAPEXsales variable
hows a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient across all estimations,
able 2
robit model [ﬁrst stage of the Heckman estimation].
Probit (1) (2) with lag
Constant −2.6122***
(0.0595)
−2.6409***
(0.0721)
Firm characteristics
LTA 0.1081***
(0.0068)
−0.0624
(0.0645)
EBITsales −0.1521**
(0.0668)
−0.0445
(0.1078)
CAPEXsales −0.8033***
(0.1119)
−0.4324*
(0.2594)
LTAt−1 0.1810***
(0.0641)
EBITsalest−1 −0.0509
(0.1028)
CAPEXsalest−1 −0.4824**
(0.2461)
Industry characteristics
PNDIV 2.1935***
(0.0675)
2.1455***
(0.0799)
PSDIV 0.5827***
(0.0487)
0.6385***
(0.0586)
Macroeconomic characteristics
changeGDP 2.0553**
(0.9330)
0.9598
(1.1168)
CONTRACTION 0.0053
(0.0058)
−0.0062
(0.0067)
Dummies year No No
No. of observations. 16,859 12051
Log likelihood −8338.9728 −5905.417
Pseudo-R2 0.1562 0.1597
his table shows probit estimation results for the selection equation (Eq. (5)) as the ﬁrst 
rm is diversiﬁed and zero otherwise. The pseudo-R square indicates the goodness of ﬁ
tatistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.for the level of diversiﬁcation. Control variables: LTA (size), EBITsales (proﬁtability),
rage), PNDIV and PSDIV (industry attractiveness), changeGDP and CONTRACTION
suggesting that companies with poorer investment are more given
to diversify.As far as industry variables are concerned, PNDIV and PSDIV 
are signiﬁcant by any standards (p-value = 0.000). This evidence 
agrees with Campa and Kedia (2002), and Villalonga (2004b), and 
indicates that ﬁrms are more likely to undertake diversiﬁcation
s (3) with dummy
years
(4) with lags and
dummy years
−2.6980***
(0.0705)
−2.7705***
(0.0838)
0.1106***
(0.0069)
−0.0599
(0.0648)
−0.1336**
(0.0672)
−0.0192
(0.1085)
−0.8207***
(0.1125)
−0.4424*
(0.2603)
0.1810***
(0.0644)
−0.0680
(0.1036)
−0.4870**
(0.2478)
2.1620***
(0.0696)
2.1323***
(0.0825)
0.5736***
(0.0490)
0.6265***
(0.0588)
1.0227
(1.4015)
0.3760
(1.5711)
0.0122
(0.0083)
0.0087
(0.0094)
Yes Yes
16859 12051
1 −8328.5744 −5896.7749
0.1572 0.1610
stage of Heckman’s procedure. The dependent variable takes the value 1 when the 
t. Standard error is shown in parentheses under coefﬁcients. ****, **, and * denote 
Table 3
Diversiﬁcation level and growth opportunities (Heckman two-step estimator) [Eq. (1)].
Dependent variable:
MBAR
Dependent variable:
Q
Dependent variable:
RDsales
Constant 1.2958***
(0.1900)
1.3861***
(0.1020)
1.3778***
(0.1039)
0.5724***
(0.1895)
0.6134***
(0.1018)
0.6159***
(0.1037)
0.0174
(0.0198)
0.0184*
(0.0104)
0.0206**
(0.0103)
Diversiﬁcation indexes
numsegments −0.0597
(0.1197)
−0.0862
(0.1194)
−0.0055
(0.0125)
numsegments2 0.0131
(0.0194)
0.0180
(0.0193)
0.0010
(0.0020)
HERF −0.8233***
(0.2585)
−0.7661***
(0.2581)
−0.0609**
(0.0253)
HERF2 0.8867**
(0.3721)
0.8564**
(0.3716)
0.0948***
(0.0356)
TotalEntropy −0.4719***
(0.1448)
−0.4562***
(0.1447)
−0.0147
(0.0140)
TotalEntropy2 0.3084***
(0.1092)
0.3123***
(0.1090)
0.0144
(0.0103)
Control variables
LTA 0.0670***
(0.0080)
0.0684***
(0.0080)
0.0704***
(0.0082)
0.1005***
(0.0080)
0.1019***
(0.0079)
0.1033***
(0.0082)
0.0010
(0.0008)
0.0009
(0.0008)
−0.0003
(0.0008)
DTA −1.3954***
(0.0821)
−1.4101***
(0.0819)
−1.4199***
(0.0862)
−0.9164***
(0.0819)
−0.9299***
(0.0818)
−0.9430***
(0.0861)
−0.0886***
(0.0082)
−0.0891***
(0.0082)
−0.0863***
(0.0085)
Inverse Mills Ratio (i) 0.1613***
(0.0334)
0.1484***
(0.0334)
0.1771***
(0.0374)
0.1409***
(0.0333)
0.1291***
(0.0333)
0.1545***
(0.0373)
0.0382***
(0.0034)
0.0382***
(0.0034)
0.0398***
(0.0036)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 16,859 16,859 10,441 16,859 16,859 10,441 15,239 15,239 8991
No. of censored obs. 12257 12257 6374 12257 12257 6374 12257 12257 6374
No. of uncensored obs. 4602 4602 4067 4602 4602 4067 2982 2982 2617
Wald Chi2 2(22) 608.62*** 625.05*** 552.65*** 526.16*** 538.05*** 497.57*** 488.73*** 496.93*** 397.71***
This table reports the Heckman second stage estimation by OLS (Heckman’s two-step estimator) of Eq. (1). The selection equation (column 1) (Table 2) models ﬁrms’ 
propensity to diversify. Different proxies for growth options ratio to the ﬁrm’s total value (GOR) (either MBAR (the market to book assets ratio), Q (Tobin’s Q), or RDsales (the 
ratio of R&D expenses to ﬁrm sales)) are regressed on the degree of diversiﬁcation. This degree of diversiﬁcation is proxied by numsegments (number of business segments), 
HERF (the Herﬁndahl index) or TotalEntropy (the Total Entropy index), alternatively. Firm size (LTA), ﬁnancial leverage (DTA), industry effect (Industry dummies), and time 
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effect (Year dummies) are controlled in all estimations. The Inverse Mills Ratio (i) is
he Wald test contrasts the null hypothesis of no joint signiﬁcance of the explana
enote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
hen there is a stronger presence of diversiﬁers in the core indus-
ry.
Also in line with Campa and Kedia (2002), macroeconomic
ariables mostly lack statistical signiﬁcance for explaining the
iversiﬁcation decision. Only ChangeGDP is signiﬁcant in the pro-
it speciﬁcation in column (1), and is positively associated with the
iversiﬁcation decision. It yields evidence that companies are more
ikely to diversify during cycles of economic growth.
Overall, our results suggest that ﬁrm and industry characteris-
ics are the key drivers of the diversiﬁcation decision. At the second
tage of the Heckman estimations, we take the probit speciﬁcation
stimated in column (1) of Table 2 to compute the correction for
elf-selection, . Thus, we omit lagged values and year dummies
hich proved mostly non-signiﬁcant, while minimizing the loss of
bservations for subsequent analyses. This probit (1) ensures the
xistence of at least four exclusion restrictions12 since PNDIV, PSDIV
hangeGDP, and CONTRACTION are included in the selection equa-
ion but not in the outcome equations, thus mitigating potential
ollinearity problems..2. The effect of diversiﬁcation on GOR
Table 3 illustrates the Heckman second-stage estimation results 
f Eq. (1) to check how GOR (proxied by MBAR, Q or RDsales)
12 The Heckman approach requires at least one variable included in the selection 
quation but not contained in the outcome equation (Puhani, 2000). The lack of 
xclusion restrictions is likely to give rise to collinearity problems and the Heckman 
stimator performs poorly in this case.ded as an additional regressor to correct potential self-selection bias in the sample.
ariables. Standard error is shown in parentheses under coefﬁcients. ****, **, and *
relates to the degree of diversiﬁcation (measured by either
numsegments, HERF or TotalEntropy), and assess the existence of an
effectwhichmaybemediated.Overall, our resultsprovideevidence
that the impact of GOR diversiﬁcation takes a U-form. When num-
segments is used to proxy for the diversiﬁcation scope, thismeasure
and its square contain no statistical signiﬁcance in any model. This
result might be explained by the fact that this proxy based on the
simple count of the number of businesses (and thus, not consider-
ing the distribution of a ﬁrm’s total business activity across them)
may fail to capture the full extent of diversiﬁcation.
However, when the degree of diversiﬁcation is approximated
by more sophisticated indexes such as HERF or TotalEntropy which
reﬂect a broader scope of this strategy, results provide strong evi-
dence (above 1% in most cases) of a U-form relationship with
growth opportunities proxies, results being robust across MBAR,
Q, and RDsales (in the case of HERF). We calculate the mini-
mum of the curve, our calculations being based on the HERF
proxy, which offers the strongest and most robust evidence in
our analyses. The critical point HERF* ranges from 0.3212 to
0.4642 across the various estimations. The estimated coefﬁcient
associated with  proves signiﬁcant above 1% in all regressions
(p-value =0.000), conﬁrming the existence of selectivity in our
sample. The Wald test indicates that variables are jointly signiﬁ-
cant.
3.3. The diversiﬁcation–value relationshipWe estimate the direct effect of diversiﬁcation on excess value 
on Tables 4a and 5a. First, we estimate a linear effect between 
diversiﬁcation and excess value (Eq. (2)). Consistent with most
Table 4a
Diversiﬁcation and excess value (Heckman two-step estimator) [Eqs. (2) and (3)].
Dependent variable: ExcessValue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant −1.8393***
(0.1441)
−1.7671***
(0.1397)
−1.8410***
(0.1440)
−1.5560***
(0.1986)
−1.7213***
(0.1421)
−1.7628***
(0.1469)
Diversiﬁcation indexes
numsegments 0.0013
(0.0193)
−0.2105**
(0.1041)
numsegments2 0.0349**
(0.0168)
HERF −0.2375***
(0.0644)
−0.6100***
(0.2254)
HERF2 0.5587*
(0.3241)
TotalEntropy −0.1050**
(0.0432)
−0.4230***
(0.1265)
TotalEntropy2 0.2543***
(0.0951)
Control variables
EBITsales 0.8732***
(0.0763)
0.8524***
(0.0764)
0.9493***
(0.0832)
0.8722***
(0.0763)
0.8490***
(0.0764)
0.9406***
(0.0832)
CAPEXsales 1.6252***
(0.1479)
1.5869***
(0.1479)
1.6951***
(0.1601)
1.6358***
(0.1479)
1.5817***
(0.1479)
1.6848***
(0.1600)
LDTA −0.1462*
(0.0782)
−0.1565**
(0.0780)
−0.1900**
(0.0819)
−0.1468*
(0.0781)
−0.1564**
(0.0780)
−0.1898**
(0.0819)
LTA 0.3898***
(0.0397)
0.3939***
(0.0397)
0.4036***
(0.0416)
0.3913***
(0.0397)
0.3952***
(0.0397)
0.4072***
(0.0415)
LTA2 −0.0208***
(0.0031)
−0.0209***
(0.0031)
−0.0219***
(0.0033)
−0.0210***
(0.0031)
−0.0211***
(0.0031)
−0.0222***
(0.0033)
Inverse Mills Ratio (i) −0.0257
(0.0295)
−0.0337
(0.0295)
−0.0339
(0.0329)
−0.0253
(0.0295)
−0.0341
(0.0294)
−0.0351
(0.0329)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 16,859 16,859 10,441 16,859 16,859 10,441
No. of censored obs. 12257 12257 6374 12257 12257 6374
No. of uncensored obs. 4602 4602 4067 4602 4602 4067
Wald Chi2 2(24) 929.16*** 945.36*** 892.95 934.32*** 948.94*** 901.65***
This table reports the Heckman second stage estimation by OLS (Heckman’s two-step estimator) of Eqs. (2) and (3). The selection equation (column 1) (Table 2) models ﬁrms’ 
propensity to diversify. Columns (1)–(6) contain the Heckman estimation of the direct effect of diversiﬁcation on ExcessValue. The Excess Value measure developed by Berger 
and Ofek (1995) is regressed on the degree of diversiﬁcation (columns (1) to (3)) and its square (columns (4) to (6)). This degree of diversiﬁcation is proxied by numsegments 
(number of business segments), HERF (the Herﬁndahl index), or TotalEntropy (the Total Entropy index), alternatively. Proﬁtability (EBITsales), level of investment in current 
operations (CAPEXsales), ﬁnancial leverage (LDTA), ﬁrm size (LTA) and its square (LTA2), industry effect (Industry dummies), and time effect (Year dummies) are controlled in 
all estimations. The Inverse Mills Ratio (i) is included as an additional regressor to correct potential self-selection bias in the sample. The Wald test contrasts the null 
hypothesis of no joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables. Standard error is shown in parentheses under coefﬁcients. ****, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 
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 %, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
rior literature, we ﬁnd a diversiﬁcation discount (columns (1)–(3)
f Table 4a). Next, we test the presence of a nonlinear effect of
iversiﬁcation on GOR. As reported in columns (4)–(6) of Table 4a
ur results reveal a U relation between the ExcessValue and
iversiﬁcation proxies (numsegments, HERF or TotalEntropy)(Eq
3)), although the lack of any statistical signiﬁcance in the 
oefﬁcient prevents us obtaining any evidence of selectiv-ity in our
ample to fully justify the use of Heckman in this case.
Alternatively, columns (4)–(6) of Table 5a contain the OLS
stimations which also support this quadratic relationship, with
ven stronger statistical signiﬁcance. In the early stages of
iversiﬁcation, diversiﬁed ﬁrms trade at a discount relative to
nisegment ﬁrms until a critical point is reached (located at
umsegments* = 3.023713; HERF* = 0.6070) from which the value
utcomes of this strategy become positive. Thus, at diversiﬁcation 
evels below this minimum, and as found in most prior papers, 
iversiﬁcation tends to trade at a discount. However, from this
13 In this case, we calculate the minimum taking the numsegments proxy since it
s statistically signiﬁcant and is easier to interpret. We also include the minimum in
erms of HERF to allow comparability with our analyses of Eq. (1).
 
 
 point, the relationship may ﬂip, and it may be possible to obtain
a diversiﬁcation premium, as supported in recent papers.
3.4. The mediating effect of GOR in the diversiﬁcation–value
relationship
Having conﬁrmed the U relation linking diversiﬁcation and GOR, 
and diversiﬁcation and ExcessValue, we go one step further to exam-
ine whether such a curvilinear effect is driven by GOR. We need to 
check whether GOR acts as a mediator in the diversiﬁcation–value 
relationship. Should this be the case, the impact of the degree of 
diversiﬁcation on ExcessValue would weaken or lose its statistical 
signiﬁcance once growth opportunities are included in the model.
Table 4b displays the Heckman two-step estimations of Eq. (4).
As shown in Table 4b, our data conﬁrm a positive and strongly
signiﬁcant statistical relationship (p-value = 0.000) between the 
proxies for growth opportunities (either MBAR, Q or RDsales) and
ExcessValue. Contrary to Stowe and Xing (2006), we ﬁnd that a
ﬁrm’s set of growth opportunities signiﬁcantly account for the 
diversiﬁcation value outcomes. Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that 
the larger the fraction represented by growth opportunities over 
the ﬁrm’s total value, the higher the ExcessValue and thus the lower
Table 4b
Heckman regression analysis of the mediating role of GOR in the diversiﬁcation-value relationship (Heckman two-step estimator) [Eq. (4)].
Controlling for the mediator: variable GOR (proxied by either MBAR, Q or RDsales)
Dependent variable: ExcessValue Dependent variable: ExcessValue Dependent variable: ExcessValue
(Estimations with MBAR) (Estimations with Q) (Estimations with RDsales)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant −2.1410***
(0.1602)
−2.3265***
(0.1150)
−2.3514***
(0.1199)
−1.8045***
(0.1591)
−1.9592***
(0.1139)
−1.9911***
(0.1186)
−1.3625***
(0.2603)
−1.5002***
(0.1775)
−1.6120***
(0.1828)
Growth opportunities proxies
MBAR 0.5249***
(0.0104)
0.5238***
(0.0104)
0.5172***
(0.0113)
Q 0.5343***
(0.0105)
0.5334***
(0.0105)
0.5274***
(0.0113)
RDsales 2.5883***
(0.2141)
2.5779***
(0.2143)
2.4161***
(0.2329)
Diversiﬁcation indexes
numsegments −0.1779**
(0.0837)
−0.1598*
(0.0833)
−0.1729
(0.1381)
numsegments2 0.0270**
(0.0136)
0.0233*
(0.0135)
0.0310
(0.0226)
HERF −0.2782
(0.1814)
−0.3222*
(0.1805)
−0.4663*
(0.2824)
HERF2 0.1778
(0.2609)
0.1972
(0.2595)
0.3850
(0.3964)
TotalEntropy −0.2547**
(0.1028)
−0.2716***
(0.1022)
−0.3347**
(0.1588)
TotalEntropy2 0.1316*
(0.0773)
0.1301*
(0.0768)
0.2107*
(0.1163)
Control variables
EBITsales 0.2793***
(0.0626)
0.2682***
(0.0627)
0.3111***
(0.0692)
0.2298***
(0.0624)
0.2162***
(0.0625)
0.2645***
(0.0688)
1.2069***
(0.0945)
1.1916***
(0.0947)
1.2482***
(0.1028)
CAPEXsales 1.4811***
(0.1191)
1.4499***
(0.1192)
1.4854***
(0.1303)
1.1852***
(0.1188)
1.1517***
(0.1188)
1.1923***
(0.1297)
1.9375***
(0.2331)
1.8888***
(0.2334)
2.2282***
(0.2525)
LDTA 0.5845***
(0.0644)
0.5793***
(0.0644)
0.5562***
(0.0684)
0.3306***
(0.0632)
0.3256***
(0.0631)
0.3056***
(0.0669)
−0.0735
(0.1040)
−0.0708
(0.1040)
−0.1402
(0.1092)
LTA 0.3300***
(0.0319)
0.3220***
(0.0319)
0.3451***
(0.0337)
0.3164***
(0.0318)
0.3191***
(0.0318)
0.3331***
(0.0336)
0.3346***
(0.0482)
0.3430***
(0.0481)
0.3733***
(0.0502)
LTA2 −0.0181***
(0.0025)
−0.0182***
(0.0025)
−0.0194***
(0.0027)
−0.0181***
(0.0025)
−0.0182***
(0.0025)
−0.0195***
(0.0026)
−0.0172***
(0.0038)
−0.0178***
(0.0038)
−0.0201***
(0.0039)
Inverse Mills Ratio (i) −0.1035***
(0.0238)
−0.1077***
(0.0239)
−0.1211***
(0.0269)
−0.0824***
(0.0237)
−0.0872***
(0.0236)
−0.1001***
(0.0267)
−0.1381***
(0.0393)
−0.1456***
(0.0392)
−0.1526***
(0.0423)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 16,859 16,859 10,441 16,859 16,859 10,441 15,239 15,239 8991
No. censored obs. 12,257 12,257 6374 12,257 12,257 6374 12257 12,257 6374
No. uncensored obs. 4602 4602 4067 4602 4602 4067 2982 2982 2617
Wald Chi2 2(24) 3963.47*** 3972.53*** 3469.10*** 4043.37*** 4061.31*** 3560.65*** 770.04*** 776.23*** 740.75***
This table reports the Heckman second stage estimation by OLS (Heckman’s two−step estimator) of the analysis of the mediating effect of GOR in the diversiﬁcation-value relationship (Eq. (4)). The selection equation (column
1) (Table 2) models ﬁrms’ propensity to diversify. Columns (7)–(15) display the Heckman estimation of ExcessValue measure developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) on both the diversiﬁcation variables and the GOR proxies. The
degree of diversiﬁcation is proxied by numsegments (number of business segments), HERF (the Herﬁndahl index) or TotalEntropy (the Total Entropy index), alternatively. Different proxies for GOR (either MBAR (the market to
book assets ratio), Q (Tobin’s Q) or RDsales (the ratio of R&D expenses to ﬁrm sales)) are used. Proﬁtability (EBITsales), level of investment in current operations (CAPEXsales), ﬁnancial leverage (LDTA), ﬁrm size (LTA) and its square
(LTA2), industry effect (Industry dummies), and time effect (Year dummies) are controlled in all estimations. The Inverse Mills Ratio (i) is included as an additional regressor to correct potential self-selection bias in the sample.
The Wald test contrasts the null hypothesis of no joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables. Standard error is shown in parentheses under coefﬁcients. ****, **, and * denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Table 5a
Diversiﬁcation and excess value (OLS) [Eqs. (2) and (3)].
Dependent variable: ExcessValue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant −1.7135***
(0.0611)
−1.7811***
(0.0605)
−1.8034***
(0.0758)
−1.6046***
(0.0655)
−1.7797***
(0.0605)
−1.8001***
(0.0757)
Diversiﬁcation indexes
numsegments −0.0644***
(0.0093)
−0.2038***
(0.0316)
numsegments2 0.0337***
(0.0073)
HERF −0.2909***
(0.0321)
−0.4962***
(0.1170)
HERF2 0.4087*
(0.2239)
TotalEntropy −0.1617***
(0.0233)
−0.3310***
(0.0599)
TotalEntropy2 0.1954***
(0.0637)
Control variables
EBITsales 0.7148***
(0.0328)
0.7113***
(0.0327)
0.8198***
(0.0449)
0.7161***
(0.0328)
0.7118***
(0.0327)
0.8208***
(0.0449)
CAPEXsales 1.2913***
(0.0627)
1.2795***
(0.0626)
1.4551***
(0.0867)
1.2917***
(0.0626)
1.2784***
(0.0626)
1.4530***
(0.0867)
LDTA −0.2664***
(0.0377)
−0.2653***
(0.0377)
−0.2456***
(0.0483)
−0.2639***
(0.0377)
−0.2648***
(0.0377)
−0.2436***
(0.0483)
LTA 0.4401***
(0.0198)
0.4411***
(0.0198)
0.4266***
(0.0244)
0.4407***
(0.0198)
0.4412***
(0.0198)
0.4275***
(0.0244)
LTA2 −0.0263***
(0.0016)
−0.0263***
(0.0016)
−0.0250***
(0.0020)
−0.0264***
(0.0016)
−0.0263***
(0.0016)
−0.0251***
(0.0020)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 16,859 16,859 10,441 16,859 16,859 10,441
F 134.76*** 136.44*** 89.03*** 130.38*** 131.14*** 85.92***
R-squared 0.1612 0.1628 0.1702 0.1622 0.1630 0.1710
Adj R-squared 0.1600 0.1617 0.1683 0.1610 0.1618 0.1690
This table reports the OLS regressions of Eqs. (2) and (3). The ExcessValue measure developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) is regressed on the level of diversiﬁcation (columns 
(1) to (3)) and its square (columns (4) to (6)). This degree of diversiﬁcation is proxied by numsegments (number of business segments), HERF (the Herﬁndahl index) or 
TotalEntropy (the Total Entropy index), alternatively. Proﬁtability (EBITsales), level of investment in current operations (CAPEXsales), ﬁnancial leverage (LDTA), ﬁrm size (LTA) 
a mies) a
s tanda
s
t
c
W
q
c
T
b
t
i
o
t
t
n
l
b
s
b
d
s
E
3
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reveal that growth opportunities partiallymediate the relationship
between diversiﬁcation and ExcessValue. In particular, the coefﬁ-
cient associated with the quadratic term of diversiﬁcation declines
14 Results are available upon request from the corresponding author. Whereas in
the Heckman two-step estimator, the selection equation and the outcome equation
are estimated separately by probit and OLS estimations, respectively, in the Heck-nd its square (LTA2), industry effect (Industry dummies), and time effect (Year dum
igniﬁcance of the explanatory variables. R-squared measures the goodness of ﬁt. S
igniﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
he discount (or the greater the premium). This ﬁnding is 
onsistent with prior works such as Ferris et al. (2002).
Our results also provide evidence supporting partial mediation.
hen GOR is accounted for, the coefﬁcients associated with the
uadratic term of diversiﬁcation reduce their statistical signiﬁ-
ance, which is even lost in the regressions on the HERF proxy.
hese ﬁndings suggest that GOR is partially mediating the U-effect
etween diversiﬁcation and ExcessValue.
In sum, growth opportunities play a relevant role in explaining
he U-form function linking diversiﬁcation and ExcessValue, mak-
ng this corporate strategy less value-destroyingafter a certain level
f diversiﬁcation. This may be due to two reasons: ﬁrstly, because
he critical points of the curve linking the degree of diversiﬁca-
ion and GOR and the one relating diversiﬁcation to ExcessValue are
ot too far away from each other (the former being lower than the
atter), suggesting in some way that this strategy becomes more
eneﬁcial at stages when a broader extent of diversiﬁcation mainly
erves as aplatform for further growthopportunities; and secondly,
ecause when GOR is included in the regression of ExcessValue on
iversiﬁcation, the quadratic term of DIVER reduces its statistical
igniﬁcance (which is particularly noticeable when HERF or Total-
ntropy are used)..5. Additional robustness checks
We conduct further robustness analyses. Firstly, we re-estimate
ll equations by an alternative procedure, the Heckman maximumre controlled in all estimations. The F test contrasts the null hypothesis of no joint 
rd error is shown in parentheses under coefﬁcients. ****, **, and * denote statistical 
likelihood (ML) estimator.14 Secondly, we winsorize the top and
bottom 5.98% of ExcessValue to reduce the effect of ‘extreme’
excess values (above 1.386 or below −1.386) (Berger and Ofek,
1995). Analyses involving Eq. (2)–(4) are then re-estimated using
the winsorized variable (wExcessValue) as a dependent variable.15
Our ﬁndings persist through these robustness tests.
In addition, in testing the mediating effect, we follow Hill and
Snell (1988), and re-estimate Eq. (4) using hierarchical regression
techniques.16 This methodology estimates Eq. (4) in which GOR
enters ﬁrst, followed by DIVER to evaluate whether any previous
signiﬁcant relationship between DIVER and ExcessValue loses sig-
niﬁcance when considering GOR. See Table 5b for a summary of the
results.
Our results remain robust to hierarchical regressions. When
using HERF and TotalEntropy as proxies for diversiﬁcation, resultsmanMLestimator, both equations are estimated jointly in a single stepbymaximum
likelihood. Assumptions for applying this ML approach are more restrictive than
those required by the Heckman two-step estimator.
15 Results are available upon request from the corresponding author.
16 As it is not a Heckman two-step technique, no  is included in the equation.
Table 5b
Hierarchical regression analyses of the mediating role of GOR in the diversiﬁcation-value relationship (OLS) [Eq. (4)].
Dependent variable: ExcessValue [ﬁrst, both mediating and control variables; then, diversiﬁcation variables]
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant −2.2952***
(0.0563)
−1.9634***
(0.0556)
−1.6827***
(0.0806)
−2.4284***
(0.0521)
−2.1083***
(0.0514)
−1.7993***
(0.0733)
−2.4435***
(0.0650)
−2.1258***
(0.0640)
−1.8650***
(0.0921)
Growth opportunities proxies
MBAR 0.4313***
(0.0054)
0.4309***
(0.0054)
0.4362***
(0.0068)
Q 0.4426***
(0.0054)
0.4422***
(0.0054)
0.4483***
(0.0069)
RDsales 1.7426***
(0.0836)
1.7374***
(0.0836)
1.7586***
(0.1104)
Diversiﬁcation indexes
numsegments −0.1534***
(0.0269)
−0.1647***
(0.0267)
−0.1351***
(0.0401)
numsegments2 0.0228***
(0.0062)
0.0231***
(0.0062)
0.0245***
(0.0093)
HERF −0.3749***
(0.0995)
−0.4124***
(0.0991)
−0.2466*
(0.1405)
HERF2 0.2723
(0.1905)
0.2724
(0.1896)
0.1407
(0.2671)
TotalEntropy −0.2443***
(0.0508)
−0.2662***
(0.0505)
−0.1715**
(0.0722)
TotalEntropy2 0.1254**
(0.0540)
0.1227**
(0.0537)
0.1052
(0.0760)
Control variables
EBITsales 0.2493***
(0.0285)
0.2139***
(0.0284)
0.8932***
(0.0405)
0.2467***
(0.0284)
0.2110***
(0.0284)
0.8904***
(0.0405)
0.2901***
(0.0389)
0.2463***
(0.0388)
0.9827***
(0.0549)
CAPEXsales 1.2123***
(0.0533)
1.0014***
(0.0531)
1.3780***
(0.0955)
1.2053***
(0.0533)
0.9940***
(0.0531)
1.3669***
(0.0956)
1.3396***
(0.0735)
1.1061***
(0.0733)
1.5763***
(0.1311)
LDTA 0.4184***
(0.0332)
0.1971 ***
(0.0324)
−0.1784***
(0.0488)
0.4174***
(0.0332)
0.1966***
(0.0324)
−0.1775***
(0.0488)
0.4438***
(0.0423)
0.2146***
(0.0413)
−0.1623***
(0.0631)
LTA 0.4025***
(0.0168)
0.3882***
(0.0168)
0.4258***
(0.0242)
0.4033***
(0.0168)
0.3891***
(0.0167)
0.4268***
(0.0242)
0.3905***
(0.0207)
0.3787***
(0.0206)
0.4240***
(0.0297)
LTA2 −0.0244***
(0.0014)
−0.0242***
(0.0014)
−0.0254***
(0.0020)
−0.0244***
(0.0014)
−0.0242***
(0.0014)
−0.0254***
(0.0020)
−0.0233***
(0.0017)
−0.0232***
(0.0017)
−0.0249***
(0.0024)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of obs. 16,859 16859 10942 16859 16859 10942 10441 10441 6754
F 420.83*** 430.65*** 102.29 421.36 431.50*** 102.53*** 272.57*** 279.69*** 66.87***
R-squared 0.3940 0.3995 0.1959 0.3943 0.4000 0.1963 0.4049 0.4112 0.2054
Adj R-squared 0.3930 0.3986 0.1940 0.3933 0.3990 0.1944 0.4035 0.4097 0.2023
This table reports the hierarchical estimations of the analysis of the mediating role of GOR in the diversiﬁcation-value relationship (Eq. (4)). Columns (7)–(15) display the OLS 
estimations of the ExcessValue measure developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) on both the diversiﬁcation variables and the GOR proxies, in which the GOR proxy is entered 
ﬁrst. The degree of diversiﬁcation is proxied by numsegments (number of business segments), HERF (the Herﬁndahl index) or TotalEntropy (the Total Entropy index), 
alternatively. Different proxies for GOR (either MBAR (the market to book assets ratio), Q (Tobin’s Q) or RDsales (the ratio of R&D expenses to ﬁrm sales)) are used. Proﬁtability 
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ffect (Year dummies) are controlled in all estimations. The F test contrasts the null
oodness of ﬁt. Standard error is shown in parentheses under coefﬁcients. ***, **, an
n statistical signiﬁcance in regressions containing TotalEntropy and
ven becomes non-signiﬁcant when HERF approximates diversi-
cation. Evidence is stronger in the case of the RDsales proxy as
he signiﬁcance of the two coefﬁcients associated with the diver-
iﬁcation variables decreases. In the case of numsegments, we ﬁnd
o evidence of a partially mediated effect, since the signiﬁcance of
hediversiﬁcation variables remains equally strong evenwhenGOR
roxies are entered ﬁrst. Results hold after replacing ExcessValue by
ExcessValue as the dependent variable.15
. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature by providing further
mpirical evidence on the diversiﬁcation–value relationship. Our
esults suggest a U-shaped effect of diversiﬁcation on a ﬁrm’s value
nd support apartialmediating role of growthopportunities on this
elationship.
Speciﬁcally, our data shows that at its lower levels, diversiﬁca-
ion has a negative effect on a ﬁrm’s market value, resulting in a
iversiﬁcation discount. However, at high levels of diversiﬁcation,A), ﬁrm size (LTA) and its square (LTA2), industry effect (Industry dummies), and time
thesis of no joint signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables. R-squared measures the
ote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
said negative relationship between diversiﬁcation and value turns
around and becomes positive. We report evidence suggesting that
this ﬁnding may be explained by growth opportunities. We ﬁnd
a U-shaped relationship between the level of diversiﬁcation and
the portion of a ﬁrm’s market value which is accounted for by
its growth opportunities. This evidence of a quadratic relationship
between diversiﬁcation and GOR may be logically interpreted as
indicating that, in the early stages of diversiﬁcation, investing in a
new business mainly involves replacing growth opportunities by
assets in place, while in its later stages diversiﬁcation becomes
a net source of further growth options. This latter effect may be
due to the progressive accumulation of knowledge and capabili-
ties arising from simultaneously taking part in several businesses,
which improves a ﬁrm’s ability to sense and seize opportunities in
a wider range of industries. Moreover, as the ﬁrm spreads its capa-
bilities across alternative businesses, further growth opportunities
are more likely to be embedded in those investments.
Additionally, we ﬁnd that the U-shaped relationship between
diversiﬁcation andGOR carries over partially to the effect of diversi-
ﬁcation on ExcessValue. This result is consistent with prior research
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Auch as Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) and Ferris et al. (2002)
ho ﬁnd that growth opportunities account for part of the diver-
iﬁcation discounts/premiums. However, we report evidence of a
ediating role of GOR on the U-shaped relation between diversiﬁ-
ation and ﬁrm value, suggesting that the effect of diversiﬁcation
n GOR explains in part how diversiﬁcation may create or destroy
alue.
According to Amihud and Lev (1981), diversiﬁcation creates
alue in so far as it cannot be replicated at a lower cost by
nvestors. Our results show that at a higher level of diversiﬁca-
ion GOR experiences a parallel increase with diversiﬁcation. This
akes corporate diversiﬁcation less attainable by investors in their
ndividual portfolios since they cannot replicate the optimal exer-
ise policy of a set of growth opportunities as a whole, thus giving
ise to a premium. This result is consistent with prior literature
uch as Raynor (2002), who argues that growth options-oriented
trategies provide a ‘strategic insurance’ and reduce ﬁrm-speciﬁc
isk in a way investors cannot replicate.
Our study suffers from certain limitations and suggests inter-
sting avenues for future research. The data is collected from a
ingle country. More extensive analyses could be performed on
n international setting. In addition, our results leave the door
pen for other possible mediating variables in the diversiﬁcation-
erformance relationship. It might be interesting to explore
hether there are additional mediators which might provide a
eeper insight into the conditions underwhich this strategymaybe
mplemented more successfully by companies. Certain theoretical
rameworks such as the real options approach, which has a close
ink to a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities and its speciﬁc resources and
apabilities, may become a helpful guide for future research.
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